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Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 4:43 pm
by normis
On March 7th, 2017, Wikileaks made public a set of documents that is being referred to as “Vault 7”. This is a large collection of documents purported to belong to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Center for Cyber Intelligence. According to Wikileaks, this disclosure is the first one, additional disclosures will be coming in the near future.

According to the released documents, the CIA supposedly has tools that can inject malicious tools into RouterOS devices, if the public interface of the RouterOS device has no firewall on port 80. The exploit is called "ChimayRed".

Quote from Wikileaks document https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_20250630.html:
"ROS 6.28 has a Firewall Filter Rule to drop access to WAN side ethernet port. This was disabled in order to throw ChimayRed"
Also, it seems that this exploit may not be functional in RouterOS version above v6.30.1 (released 2015-07-15).

Quote from Wikileaks document https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_20251203.html:
"Downgraded to ROS 6.30.1. ChimayRed does not support 6.30.2"
Since none of the tools and malware referenced in the initial Vault 7 disclosure have been made available by Wikileaks, it is currently unclear if the malware tries to exploit any vulnerability in current RouterOS releases (6.38.5 'current' and 6.37.5 'bugfix' or newer). We will continue to strengthen RouterOS services and have already released RouterOS version 6.38.5 which removes any malicious files in devices that have been compromised. MikroTik will follow Wikileaks for any new information on this exploit.

Most RouterBOARD products come with default firewall rules that already protect against malicious access from the public interface. If you have disabled these rules, or have cleared the default config, please apply firewall rules on the public interfaces of your devices to block access to port 80, upgrade RouterOS to the latest version and follow general router protection guides in our documentation, like limiting access only to your own IP address and disabling unused services.

UPDATE 1: Hotspot is not affected by the vulnerabilities outlined above.

UPDATE 2: v6.38.5 and 6.39rc49 has been released, this version fixes the vulnerabilities outlined in the above documents, and cleans any files installed by the tools described.

UPDATE 3: As of November 2017, Wikileaks have NOT followed up their claims and have not provided any tools for our inspection.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 5:00 pm
by 0ldman
Thanks for the update.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 5:29 pm
by R1CH
Thanks for the update. Have Mikrotik reached out to Wikileaks in order to obtain an early release of the ChimayRed tool?
"Downgraded to ROS 6.30.1. ChimayRed does not support 6.30.2"
The reason it doesn't work with 6.30.2 is most likely due to memory or executable offsets changing between versions. Exploits tend to be very sensitive to the layout of memory and executables, so every time a new RouterOS release is made, the exploit authors will have to code in offsets specifically for that version (this is why the exploit appears to query the version from the httpd). So while it sounds like > 6.30.2 are unaffected, I do not believe this to be the case unless some vulnerable code was patched in 6.30.2.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 5:37 pm
by ptoribiop
Thanks for the information Normis. We will be attentive to the updates.
regards

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 6:01 pm
by Ape
Hi,

thank you very much normis!
This is a real professional handling of the situation.

Regards,
Ape

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 6:02 pm
by Lakis
''the CIA supposedly has tools that can inject malicious tools into RouterOS devices,''
it's not possible to do that without admin password second ROS kernel is closed not like Ubq source code
That's why CIA ''supposedly'' has tools

Any way how can I find if, how or ''supposedly'' my router is infected with so called "ChimayRed"?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 6:15 pm
by kez
Normis, Mikrotik should release a tool to check if there is any suspicious file.
If the router was infected running an exploitable version, maybe the trojan continues in the system.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 6:43 pm
by macgaiver
Any way how can I find if, how or ''supposedly'' my router is infected with so called "ChimayRed"?
From what i read:
There is no solid information about that yet, without hacking tools themselves, they need to have 'supposedly'' hacked router on their hands to determine and create precise method of detection, at this point firewall log rule for TCP/80 ( maybe TCP/8291) port from and to router (input/output) will work just as well , just look if there are some out-of-ordinary traffic - persistent connections that don't suppose to be there.

It looks like MT just released 6.38.4, that, just in case, clears all file system from any stuff unrelated to RouterOS.
*) filesystem - implemented procedures to verify and restore internal file structure integrity upon upgrading;
And in fact with given set of information that is all they can do atm.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 6:44 pm
by Hotz1
... it is currently unclear if the malware tries to exploit any vulnerability in current RouterOS releases (6.38.4 'current' and 6.37.5 'bugfix' or newer)...
FYI, the current download page still indicates the bugfix version as 6.37.4. Not sure if 6.37.5 was a typo, or if the page needs to be updated.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 6:46 pm
by macgaiver
... it is currently unclear if the malware tries to exploit any vulnerability in current RouterOS releases (6.38.4 'current' and 6.37.5 'bugfix' or newer)...
FYI, the current download page still indicates the bugfix version as 6.37.4. Not sure if 6.37.5 was a typo, or if the page needs to be updated.
I think that is on purpose, bugfix probably takes more time to be released.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 7:58 pm
by macsrwe
We will continue to strengthen RouterOS services and have already released RouterOS version 6.38.4 which removes any malicious files in devices that have been compromised.
The obvious question is: does it report the presence of such files if any are detected?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 9:02 pm
by IPANetEngineer
Thanks for the update Normis.

So as far as you can tell or are aware, the only way to exploit a router is if port 80 is open to the internet and the HTTP service is enabled?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 10:04 pm
by ndbjorne
Thank you.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 11:19 pm
by francisconeto
Thanks for the update Normis.

So as far as you can tell or are aware, the only way to exploit a router is if port 80 is open to the internet and the HTTP service is enabled?

Please could you confirm this Normis ?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Wed Mar 08, 2017 11:36 pm
by omega-00
Thanks for the update Normis.
So as far as you can tell or are aware, the only way to exploit a router is if port 80 is open to the internet and the HTTP service is enabled?
Please could you confirm this Normis ?
In the documents provided by wikileaks it details this - you can ask MikroTik but they are (like the rest of us) just working off the information that has been made available thus far.

Source: https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_20250869.html
Operator Notes
ROS 6.28 has a Firewall Filter Rule to drop access to WAN side ethernet port. This was disabled in order to throw ChimayRed.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 3:04 am
by markdutton
Whilst we block most of our client routers from the Internet to all but our own IP address for management, there are some clients who want to have the graphs publicly available.

I would like to see a separate port for graphing if possible so that this functionality can be available to anyone without leaving port 80 open for management. Alternatively, have an option to remove management capability from the internal web server so it has no access to ROS and config, leaving all management to Winbox and CLI.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 3:29 am
by macsrwe
Alternatively, have an option to remove management capability from the internal web server so it has no access to ROS and config, leaving all management to Winbox and CLI.
You can limit the IP addresses for defined users. Just make sure that any user IDs that have anything more than read capability can log in only from the LAN side of the network.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 4:34 am
by markdutton
You can limit the IP addresses for defined users. Just make sure that any user IDs that have anything more than read capability can log in only from the LAN side of the network.
Yeah I know I can limit IP on the graphing, but what I would like to see is open to world graphing. From my understanding the ChimayRed hack is not dependent on authenticating to the box. Although the issue is fixed with current ROS releases,it would be nice to have the web server for graphing isolated from the router core so any future compromise leads nowhere.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 7:01 am
by pauljames
Normis, thank you for the posting and info on Vault 7 and how it might affect a Mikrotik device as well as having the upgrade.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 8:45 am
by normis
Have Mikrotik reached out to Wikileaks
Yes, but as you can imagine, all the big tech companies are probably doing the same.
most likely due to memory or executable offsets changing between versions
Likely, maybe, but nothing is definite. We are researching.
Mikrotik should release a tool to check if there is any suspicious file.
We have so far not seen a single affected device, we are only working based on the released text documents, so it is not yet possible to create a tool with high accuracy. All we can do is clean the system upon upgrade to 6.38.4
page still indicates the bugfix version as 6.37.4. Not sure if 6.37.5 was a typo, or if the page needs to be updated.
We plan to release it later today
does it report the presence of such files if any are detected
No. We clean the system as such, we do not speculate if a certain file came from this malware or from elsewhere.
So as far as you can tell or are aware, the only way to exploit a router is if port 80 is open to the internet and the HTTP service is enabled?
Please could you confirm this Normis ?
Yes
here are some clients who want to have the graphs publicly available.
You can open the port 80 for the specific customer IP address, or use graphing on external services through SNMP until we provide alternate solutions

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 1:06 pm
by nuclearcat
Hi,

It would be nice if Mikrotik can take some proactive steps. For example IOS/Junos devices has proper shell in devices, and as sysadmin i can inspect system integrity easily, including taking storage/filesystem dumps over dd, checksums for all filesystem files and etc, and i can run also scripts to check for changes over time.
With mikrotik i am totally blind, if someone plant in device backdoor, as they state in document - they dont need even to bother to hide it, it will reflect only on memory consumption, which is not reliable method at all to detect malware. And even Mikrotik will(and as far as i remember there is some) implement their own integrity check, be sure, they will find way around it, so vendor should provide a way for customer to implement integrity verification over several ways, as it more "raw" - it's better (more ways to detect it).

P.S. Please take appropriate steps with recursive DNS server. It is matter of time someone will open this subject, but lack of ACL and/or easiness of putting "allow all", together with lack of any default defensive methods (throttling of specific abusive requests) making Mikrotik units as a top dns amplification DDoS source.
For example severely throttling ips doing identical requests, requests with large answers and etc.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 2:09 pm
by jarda
I appreciate the way how mikrotik officially stands in this situation. Thank you.

My questions is what was the attacking vector because we were told in the past that even authorised user with Ros admin rights cannot manipulate with system files or inject and run whatever code.

So how it could be possible to do it without any authorisation?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 2:25 pm
by pietroscherer
Normis,

Thank you for reply!
No. We clean the system as such, we do not speculate if a certain file came from this malware or from elsewhere.
This procedure will become a routine in every new release, to warranty that the system will be always free of any suspicious file?

Thank you again!

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 2:29 pm
by doush
They get shell access by exploiting an unknown vulnerability.
But the funny part is, we as the owner of these devices with full privileges doesnt have any shell access to play with :)
It is time for mikrotik to step up and give us a basic shell where we can check suspicious files etc..
As @nuclearcat stated, even JunOS has one. Why not mikrotik ?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 2:39 pm
by normis
v6.38.5 has just been released, with vulnerabilities closed. Everyone please upgrade.

RC and Bugfix builds coming a bit later.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 2:40 pm
by slawekk
It is only www management interface problem or Hotspot service is affected too?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 2:50 pm
by ppereira
Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release
by jarda » Thu Mar 09, 2017 9:09 am

I appreciate the way how mikrotik officially stands in this situation. Thank you.

My questions is what was the attacking vector because we were told in the past that even authorised user with Ros admin rights cannot manipulate with system files or inject and run whatever code.

So how it could be possible to do it without any authorisation?
+1

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 3:00 pm
by nuclearcat
They get shell access by exploiting an unknown vulnerability.
But the funny part is, we as the owner of these devices with full privileges doesnt have any shell access to play with :)
It is time for mikrotik to step up and give us a basic shell where we can check suspicious files etc..
As @nuclearcat stated, even JunOS has one. Why not mikrotik ?
I can say more - it does became requirements even in old deployments, and many customers started to ask how we can inspect if our systems are breached. As i say there is no way and tools at all, sorry, they ask to provide alternative solution, that can do so.
Unfortunately, if before administrators was able to slip it between fingers such drawback of mikrotik solutions, because it is very low cost, after this incident any IA/Security engineer will demand complete removal of hardware/software that can't be isolated and can't be inspected for possible "implants".
So proper solution is needed badly, and will be great if mikrotik can make in very reasonable time some tool, for existing systems, to verify if they have such implants.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 3:04 pm
by normis
So how it could be possible to do it without any authorisation?
that is the definition of an exploit :) to be able to do something that was not supposed to be possible.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 3:13 pm
by normis
It is only www management interface problem or Hotspot service is affected too?
Hotspot is NOT affected by the vulnerability described in the Vault 7 leaks published on March 7.
So people with public hotspots are safe.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 4:10 pm
by notToNew
v6.38.5 has just been released, with vulnerabilities closed. Everyone please upgrade.
Will you please also release a fix for 6.36.4 as it is the only version which works with my wireless-devices?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 4:22 pm
by normis
v6.38.5 has just been released, with vulnerabilities closed. Everyone please upgrade.
Will you please also release a fix for 6.36.4 as it is the only version which works with my wireless-devices?
The fix for your wireless issue is fixed in 6.38.5 as well
*) wireless - improved compatibility with Intel 2200BG wireless card;

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 5:47 pm
by BartoszP
...So proper solution is needed badly, and will be great if mikrotik can make in very reasonable time some tool, for existing systems, to verify if they have such implants.
Are you sure ?
You are asking them to write antivirus software for all version till 6.30.2 ? Isn't it smarter to upgrade routers to newer versions ?
What if you will not find any virus installed ? Do you leave routers "open" for beeing attacked ? Do you want to secure them other way ?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 6:06 pm
by lastguru
They get shell access by exploiting an unknown vulnerability.
But the funny part is, we as the owner of these devices with full privileges doesnt have any shell access to play with :)
It is time for mikrotik to step up and give us a basic shell where we can check suspicious files etc..
As @nuclearcat stated, even JunOS has one. Why not mikrotik ?
A proper hack would modify the shell, so that it would hide the presence of such files. So, if a router is hacked, any and all available tools are not to be trusted. Moreover, that would create a false sense of security. Only the upgrade process can be relied upon in this case.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 6:18 pm
by nuclearcat
...So proper solution is needed badly, and will be great if mikrotik can make in very reasonable time some tool, for existing systems, to verify if they have such implants.
Are you sure ?
You are asking them to write antivirus software for all version till 6.30.2 ? Isn't it smarter to upgrade routers to newer versions ?
What if you will not find any virus installed ? Do you leave routers "open" for beeing attacked ? Do you want to secure them other way ?
Yes i am sure.
Its not antivirus at all, not even close, it is trivial file/filesystem structure integrity verification tool, and it is trivial to write as well to detect unathorized modified executable/library files.
Also it is not a virus at all, such "implants" don't replicate themself.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 6:23 pm
by nuclearcat
They get shell access by exploiting an unknown vulnerability.
But the funny part is, we as the owner of these devices with full privileges doesnt have any shell access to play with :)
It is time for mikrotik to step up and give us a basic shell where we can check suspicious files etc..
As @nuclearcat stated, even JunOS has one. Why not mikrotik ?
A proper hack would modify the shell, so that it would hide the presence of such files. So, if a router is hacked, any and all available tools are not to be trusted. Moreover, that would create a false sense of security. Only the upgrade process can be relied upon in this case.
It will be MUCH more difficult to hide all traces of presence from raw storage reading tool (similar to dd) + memory inspection + regular checksum verification + common linux rootkit detection techniques.
Right now Mikrotik provide no tools at all to detect malicious content inside system, and if it is possible to plant this payload even without exploit, just if bad person have access to hardware for a while, and trivial to provide for this malware persistence.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 7:06 pm
by R1CH
v6.38.5 has just been released, with vulnerabilities closed. Everyone please upgrade.

RC and Bugfix builds coming a bit later.
After people have had time to upgrade, could you share some technical details of how the exploit work or what was vulnerable?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 7:13 pm
by nuclearcat
v6.38.5 has just been released, with vulnerabilities closed. Everyone please upgrade.

RC and Bugfix builds coming a bit later.
After people have had time to upgrade, could you share some technical details of how the exploit work or what was vulnerable?
Why to give hints for hackers, who will might create botnet from non-upgraded mikrotiks?
It is enough obvious already this exploit seems was using some function from management web-interface, that is most probably available without authorization.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 7:25 pm
by R1CH
v6.38.5 has just been released, with vulnerabilities closed. Everyone please upgrade.

RC and Bugfix builds coming a bit later.
After people have had time to upgrade, could you share some technical details of how the exploit work or what was vulnerable?
Why to give hints for hackers, who will might create botnet from non-upgraded mikrotiks?
It is enough obvious already this exploit seems was using some function from management web-interface, that is most probably available without authorization.
If you opened your management services to the internet and run old versions of software then it's your own problem. Any service exposed to the internet without being updated is in the same situation, expect outdated services to be compromised regardless if it's RouterOS, Linux, Windows, etc. I want to know the details so I can evaluate if further services in RouterOS may be vulnerable (ie winbox) and what kind of coding bug allowed the device to be fully compromised (was it a simple mistake that code review could have spotted, or some complex series of minor bugs that unfolded into full compromise?). Also keep in mind the exploit is already circulating, having it public or not doesn't really make much difference.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 7:39 pm
by jarda
Please make also the fix for last mipsle working version...

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 7:44 pm
by nuclearcat
If you opened your management services to the internet and run old versions of software then it's your own problem. Any service exposed to the internet without being updated is in the same situation, expect outdated services to be compromised regardless if it's RouterOS, Linux, Windows, etc. I want to know the details so I can evaluate if further services in RouterOS may be vulnerable (ie winbox) and what kind of coding bug allowed the device to be fully compromised (was it a simple mistake that code review could have spotted, or some complex series of minor bugs that unfolded into full compromise?). Also keep in mind the exploit is already circulating, having it public or not doesn't really make much difference.
Majority of users dont bother to change defaults. Majority of users also doesn't bother to update, if it is working. None of vendors in normal mental health release exploit details, because it will directly hurt their users(and users will have full right to sue such vendor for irresponsible disclosure), in best case they might release IDS signatures, but usually signatures disclose how exploit works, just specific "triggers", such as shellcode offsets in released scripts and etc.
Whoever can do security assessment and qualified enough to run disassembler will find such bugs by themself without any hints, and mostly such skilled people wont release their findinds in public. But most probably they will sell them to cia/nsa/etc :)

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 8:08 pm
by R1CH
Defaults block WAN access, so no need to worry about those users.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 8:18 pm
by nuclearcat
RB1100/1200, CCR - doesnt have such rules.
Often inexperienced admins removed such rules intentionally, to access mikrotik from outside.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Thu Mar 09, 2017 11:47 pm
by BartoszP
....
Yes i am sure.
Its not antivirus at all, not even close, it is trivial file/filesystem structure integrity verification tool, and it is trivial to write as well to detect unathorized modified executable/library files.
Also it is not a virus at all, such "implants" don't replicate themself.
It would be kind of antivirus ... checking file system integrity is one of antivirus check.
IMHO just upgrade.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Fri Mar 10, 2017 12:25 pm
by pukkita
@normis: Really appreciate mikrotik's openness and inmediacy on this issue.
...So proper solution is needed badly, and will be great if mikrotik can make in very reasonable time some tool, for existing systems, to verify if they have such implants.
[...]
It will be MUCH more difficult to hide all traces of presence from raw storage reading tool (similar to dd) + memory inspection + regular checksum verification + common linux rootkit detection techniques.
Right now Mikrotik provide no tools at all to detect malicious content inside system, and if it is possible to plant this payload even without exploit, just if bad person have access to hardware for a while, and trivial to provide for this malware persistence.
You don't need such a tool to verify if a system has been compromised.

A much direct, and less time consuming way :

1.- Put another router (or switch) in front of router to be tested (L2)
2.- Torch it / look at outgoing connections.

or, if possible (no in production service traffic):

1.- Replace the router to be tested
2.- set up a controlled lab environment with a router/switch in L2 in front of device to be tested
3.- Torch/analyze outgoing connections

Regarding integrity tools: You can already check installed packages integrity via System > Packages [Check Installation].

Developing such tools won't bring anything anyway, as any properly implemented "hack" would compromise such integrated tools.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Fri Mar 10, 2017 12:33 pm
by nuclearcat
...So proper solution is needed badly, and will be great if mikrotik can make in very reasonable time some tool, for existing systems, to verify if they have such implants.
[...]
It will be MUCH more difficult to hide all traces of presence from raw storage reading tool (similar to dd) + memory inspection + regular checksum verification + common linux rootkit detection techniques.
Right now Mikrotik provide no tools at all to detect malicious content inside system, and if it is possible to plant this payload even without exploit, just if bad person have access to hardware for a while, and trivial to provide for this malware persistence.
You don't need such a tool to verify if a system has been compromised.

A much direct, and less time consuming way :

1.- Put another router (or switch) in front of router to be tested
2.- Torch it / look at outgoing connections.
Much direct - maybe, but less consuming? definitely no, if it is not single box at home.
For example, one of my customers have several racks of CCR, with almost all ports utilized (aggregation network), how often he should remove and put spare ones and how many people he need to sit and watch torch? Can you imagine labor cost and downtime comparing with proper integrity verification that is done completely automated way?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Fri Mar 10, 2017 12:43 pm
by pukkita
Can you imagine labor cost and downtime comparing with proper integrity verification that is done completely automated way?
Yes... What I cannot imagine is such a company leaving webfig enabled and open to the internet (or any other management tools).

I'm confident Mikrotik would produce such detection package for current hack/situation, but for that they need a compromised system to analyze, so it's up to Wikileaks to collaborate, there's little more they can do.

And there would be no point on having them as a system tool, as again, any properly implemented exploit/hack will bypass them.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Fri Mar 10, 2017 12:55 pm
by nuclearcat
Can you imagine labor cost and downtime comparing with proper integrity verification that is done completely automated way?
Yes... What I cannot imagine is such a company leaving webfig enabled and open to the internet (or any other management tools) .

Mikrotik would produce such detection package for current hack, but for that they need a compromised system, so it's up to Wikileaks to collaborate, there's little more they can do.

And there would be no point on having them as a system tool, as again, any properly implemented exploit/hack will bypass them.
It should be expected, that exploits may exist for other ports/protocols.
Also, it is easy to see in wikileaks documents, for such infiltrators it is much harder to hide artifacts of implant on cisco, that has quite comprehensive debug tools, but trivial to hide on mikrotik, because it has no tools at all.

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Fri Mar 10, 2017 3:26 pm
by jarda
Please make also the fix for last mipsle working version...
Normis, what about the 6.32.4, the last working mipsle 6.x version? Will we get the bugfix version 6.32.5 to secure the routers?

Re: Statement on Vault 7 document release

Posted: Fri Mar 10, 2017 3:36 pm
by normis
Please make also the fix for last mipsle working version...
Normis, what about the 6.32.4, the last working mipsle 6.x version? Will we get the bugfix version 6.32.5 to secure the routers?
This architecture is not supported anymore. As you know, firewall protects the devices against any such vulnerabilties. You could even disable www services altogether.